Basel III, as proposed, will apply significant changes to regulatory capital calculations to all insured banks and savings associations that are domiciled in the United States.

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has announced several ways that whistleblowers can annonomously access a "direct line of communication" to the Bureau to report potential violations of federal consumer financial laws.

TESTIMONY OF DAVID BARIS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF BANK DIRECTORS HEARING BEFORE US SENATE COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS WASHINGTON, D.C.

The American Association of Bank Directors urging the White House to work with Treasury so that many banks and bank holding companies that have applied for SBLF funding and have been recommended by their primary bank regulator to participate in the program will be able to participate and will not be barred from participating solely because the regulator requires its prior approval before dividends are paid to Treasury.

TESTIMONY OF DAVID BARIS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF BANK DIRECTORS BEFORE THE US HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CONSUMER CREDIT

Letter received by AABD from the FDIC in response to AABD position on loan approvals by bank boards

The American Banker published an article written by David Baris, AABD Executive Director, describing the risks related to the approval of loans by bank directors. The article was based on a letter sent to the FDIC by the AABD.

On May 11, 2011, David Baris, Executive Director of AABD, submitted a statement for a hearing held by the Capital Markets Subcommittee of the House Financial Services Committee calling for the repeal of the whistleblowing provisions of Dodd-Frank. The statement pointed out that when Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, it did not adequately consider the ramifications of the whistleblowing provisions on the internal reporting systems set up by public companies under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The law undermines the authority of boards of directors of banks and other companies to rely on loyal employees who have a fiduciary duty to report possible securities and other violations or improprieties to their companies, and should be repealed as soon as possible.

Good afternoon Chairman Garrett, Ranking Member Waters and members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to submit this statement in connection with today’s hearings on the whistleblowing provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act, as enacted by the Dodd-Frank Act.

AABD has requested FDIC Chairman Bair to permit bank directors to copy or have access to bank documents they need to defend themselves against suits by the FDIC as receiver of their institutions. The FDIC recently asserted in a lawsuit against a law firm that had been retained by the board of directors of a bank that ultimately failed that the directors had no right to such documents and demanded that the firm return all fees paid by the bank to assist the board members in preparing for a possible suit against them.

On January 25, 2011, Michael Krimminger, FDIC's General Counsel, responded to AABD regarding a letter to FDIC Chairman Bair requesting that bank directors be permitted to copy or have access to bank documents they need to defend themselves against suits by the FDIC as receiver of their institutions.

On December 17, 2010, AABD submitted comments on the SEC's proposed whistleblowing regulations. AABD concluded that while the SEC has made good faith efforts to reconcile support for internal corporate compliance systems with the offering of a bounty to corporate employees to circumvent those systems, the conflict is irreconcialable. Therefore AABD urged the SEC to recommend to the new Congress to repeal the statutory provisions on whistleblowing in Dodd Frank.

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A key element of any robust compliance system is reliance on employees who suspect or discover improper behavior to report it to the Audit Committee or other reporting bodies within the company so that prompt review and necessary corrective action is taken on a timely basis. Yet, Section 21F tempts employees to bypass the corporate compliance processes by offering them significant bounties.

The Small Business Jobs and Credit Act of 2010 was passed and signed into law on September 27, 2010. AABD supported a House amendment to the bill (Section 113) which would have allowed banks to amortize real estate loan and OREO losses for up to ten years for regulatory capital calculation purposes. The House approved the amendment in June, but the Senate version omitted the provision.

The Small Business Jobs and Credit Act of 2010 was signed into law on September 27, 2010. The memorandum below from Noel Gruber of BuckleySandler summarizes the provisions of the Act. There is much to commend in the Act—it gives banks with CAMELS ratings of 1, 2, or 3 an opportunity to raise capital through a Department of Treasury investment. However, it does not help those banks with CAMELS ratings of 4 or 5.

On July 21, 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Section 612 of this Act restricts the ability of banks to choose their charters if they are under an enforcement order, agreement or Memorandum of Understanding with their current regulator.

On June 21, 2010, the federal banking agencies adopted a final rule on incentive compensation that will add to the responsibilities of bank directors in overseeing compensation paid by their respective banks.

There is a sleeper provision in section 612 of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act currently being worked on by a House-Senate Conference Committee that unnecessarily erodes the dual banking system that has been in place for almost 150 years.

AABD is opposed to rules that unnecessarily restrict the authority of a bank's board of directors and its compensation committee to decide how to use compensation to attract, retain, and motivate officers and other employees. The Fed's proposed "guidance" is much more than that, and can lead to enforcement actions in which the Fed can direct its member banks and bank holding companies to adopt policies and procedures and structure incentive compensation plans that the Fed believes are necessary to prevent excessive risks to the institution.

From its inception, AABD has striven to help assure that bank directors are given reasonable protections against personal liability and the tools with which to meet their duties and responsibilities.

A fundamental legal principle underlying the development of the modern American corporation has been the ability of the directors to reasonably delegate duties to subordinate officers and employees without the fear of personal liability. This principle is reflected in state statutes and case law as well as the Model Business Corporation Act.

Just as the U.S. Congress takes final legislative action whose objective is to provide regulatory relief (but see AABD's position on Section 405 of HR 3505), there is little relief for bank directors. In fact, as the attached documents reflect, the regulatory burdens on bank directors are high and, we believe, are getting higher.

On October 13, 2006, the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act was signed into law as P.L. 109-351. Undoubtedly there are provisions in the Act that are very favorable to the banking industry. AABD was never opposed to those provisions. AABD's only opposition related to Section 702, which is part of the new law.

WASHINGTON: A provision in regulatory-relief legislation could hold directors responsible for bailing out troubled banks. The provision would give federal regulators more authority to force directors to reach into their own pockets to recapitalize their banks if their capital fell below specific levels.

It has been almost fifteen years since the S&L debacle passed into history. But one of the more frightening pieces of that history may be resurrected in the form of a provision in the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act (HR 3505), which the House of Representatives passed on March 8, 2006. The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs reported out of committee a streamed-down version on May 4, 2006, and the Senate passed that version on May 25, 2006.

Title 12, United States Code Conversion of state charter to national banking association charter; execution of organization certificate and articles of association and other documents necessary to convert. 12 U.S.C. 35. Issuance of preferred stock. 12 U.S.C. 51a. Sale of a shareholder's stock at public auction to enforce payment of a deficiency assessment imposed on the shareholder. 12 U.S.C. 55. Declaration of a dividend. 12 U.S.C. 60. 12 U.S.C. 626 (foreign banking). Appointment of a director to fill a vacancy in the board. 12 U.S.C. 74. Designation of day to elect directors when regularly scheduled election is not held for some reason. 12 U.S.C. 75. Designation of a director other than the bank president to be chairman of the board. 12 U.S.C. 76. Surrender Trust Powers. 12 U.S.C. 92a. Designation of bank officer to sign certification of accuracy of the bank's call report. 12 U.S.C. 161. Supervision of liquidator of the bank. 12 U.S.C. 181. Notice to public and OCC that a vote...

For those directors of banks that are in formation or have been formed within the past five years, recent studies performed by the staffs of the Federal Reserve Banks of Chicago, Atlanta and San Francisco should be of interest.